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CALIFORNIA SHOULD RETURN TO THE 
INDIRECT INITIATIVE 
Robert M. Stern* 
Recognizing that California’s initiative system is under attack, this 
Article proposes a return to the indirect initiative process, which 
California adopted in 1911 and repealed in 1966. If an initiative’s 
proponents gather a sufficient number of signatures, the indirect 
initiative process allows the legislature to review and pass the proposal 
before placing the initiative on the ballot, eliminating the need for a 
traditional vote. This Article explains the history behind California’s 
initiative process, examines the reasons why California repealed the 
indirect initiative once before, and explores the indirect initiative 
variations that other states employ. After addressing the arguments 
against the indirect initiative process, this Article puts forth an 
amended indirect initiative solution—one that would quell voters’ 
concerns by reducing the number of measures on the ballot and by 
encouraging better-drafted initiatives. 
 
 * Robert M. Stern is President of the Center for Governmental Studies (CGS), a nonprofit, 
nonpartisan research organization, located in Los Angeles, which studies the governmental 
process. He is a co-author of several California initiatives, including the Political Reform Act 
(Proposition 9), which was passed by 70 percent of the state’s voters in June 1974. He was the 
first General Counsel of the California Fair Political Practices Commission, past Elections 
Counsel to the California Secretary of State, and Committee Counsel to the California 
Legislature’s Assembly Elections and Reapportionment Committee. He was assisted by CGS 
Intern Stephen Siciliano, who provided research assistance. 
  
672 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:671 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I.  INTRODUCTION ............................................................................. 673 
II.  CALIFORNIA’S INDIRECT INITIATIVE PROCESS ............................ 674 
III.  USE OF INDIRECT INITIATIVE IN STATES OTHER THAN 
CALIFORNIA ........................................................................... 676 
IV.  IDEAL SYSTEM FOR CALIFORNIA ............................................... 679 
 A.  Arguments Against the Indirect Initiative ....................... 681 
 B.  Better-Drafted Initiatives ................................................. 683 
V.  CONCLUSION ............................................................................... 685 
  
Winter 2011] INDIRECT INITIATIVE 673 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
California’s initiative process needs to be preserved but 
improved. It is under attack by a number of people in and out of the 
state. Those who support the initiative process recognize that it is not 
perfect but are concerned that those who want to get rid of it will 
propose changes to undermine it. On the other hand, those who 
oppose direct democracy are reluctant to suggest anything to 
improve it for fear that states currently lacking a direct democracy 
system might adopt an ideal process. And finally, there are those 
who say that they like the initiative process but that California’s use 
of it gives it a bad name. They are asking for ways to make the 
process better while still keeping it. 
The Center for Governmental Studies (CGS) has issued two 
editions of its book on this initiative process, Democracy by 
Initiative: Shaping California’s Fourth Branch of Government. CGS 
published the first edition in 19921 and the substantially revised 
second edition in May 2008.2 Both books suggest as their major 
recommendation returning to what is called the “indirect initiative.”3 
What is the indirect initiative? In its simplest terms, it allows the 
legislature to review an initiative before it is put on the ballot.4 If the 
legislature decides to pass the proposal, then the voters do not have 
to consider it. 5 California, at one time, had this process, and ten other 
states currently use it in one form or another. 6 This Article will 
examine what the indirect initiative was in California until it was 
repealed in 1966,7 what it is in other states, and why and how 
California should return to it in a new and improved way. 
 
 1. CTR. FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE: SHAPING 
CALIFORNIA’S FOURTH BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT (1st ed. 1992). 
 2. CTR. FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE: SHAPING 
CALIFORNIA’S FOURTH BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT (2d ed. 2008). 
 3. See id. at 17–18. 
 4. Id. at 4. 
 5. Id. at 47 n.51. 
 6. Id. at 124 n.72 (highlighting that California repealed its indirect initiative process in 
1966 and noting that Alaska, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Nevada, Ohio, Utah, 
Washington, and Wyoming all currently employ a form of the indirect initiative process). 
Mississippi also uses the indirect initiative process for its constitutional amendments. MISS. 
CONST. art. 15, § 273. 
 7. CTR. FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, supra note 2, at 4. 
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II.  CALIFORNIA’S INDIRECT INITIATIVE PROCESS 
When California’s voters adopted the initiative process in 1911, 
they allowed the legislature to get involved if the proponents of an 
initiative so desired.8 In doing so, the voters gave an incentive to the 
proponents to use the indirect process. If the sponsors of a proposed 
initiative were willing to have the legislature review and perhaps 
adopt their measure, they needed to gather signatures of at least 5 
percent of the total votes cast at the last gubernatorial election.9 If, on 
the other hand, the proponents did not want the legislature to 
consider their initiative, the proponents had to collect signatures 
amounting to at least 8 percent of the last gubernatorial vote—37.5 
percent more signatures. 10 
One would assume that most proponents would have chosen to 
collect fewer signatures and go to the legislature. Yet, in reality, few 
proponents used the indirect alternative. 11 Consequently, most 
political experts have assumed that the indirect process failed. 12 But 
if one looks more carefully at the rules the process requires, the 
reason for the indirect process’s lack of use becomes clear. 
Before 1967, the California legislature was a part-time 
legislature, meeting for six months in odd-numbered years 13 and for 
a short budget-only session in even-numbered years. 14 Thus, the 
legislature could only consider all non-budgetary matters, including 
initiatives, in the odd-numbered years. 15 In order for an initiative 
proponent to meet the deadline for the legislature to consider the 
measure in an odd-numbered year session, the proponent had to 
circulate the initiative almost two and one half years before the 
election in which the initiative would appear. 16 Under the provisions 
of the California Constitution, the proponent had to qualify the 
initiative ten days before the legislative session began, and the 
 
 8. Id. at 32. 
 9. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (repealed 1966). 
 10. Id. 
 11. CTR. FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, supra note 2, at 48 n.51. 
 12. See id. at 72–83. 
 13. Id. at 4. 
 14. Id. at 113 n.47. 
 15. Id. at 113. 
 16. Id. 
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legislature had only forty days to pass or reject the measure. 17 If the 
legislature failed to approve the measure in the odd-numbered year, 
it would then go on the November ballot in the following even-
numbered year. 18 Unlike today, where initiatives appear on both the 
June and November ballots, initiatives only appeared on the 
November ballot during this period. 19 
Prior to the repeal of the indirect alternative in 1966, only 
nineteen initiative proponents had opted to use the indirect process. 20 
Of the nineteen initiatives, only four measures received enough 
signatures to force the legislature to consider them, 21 and the 
legislature enacted only one (a measure concerning fishing control) 
in 1936. 22 The three indirect initiatives that the legislature rejected 
thus appeared on the ballot. In 1942, voters rejected an initiative that 
would have reorganized the building and loan associations; 23 in 
1952, voters approved an initiative placing old-age-security 
programs under the state—rather than the counties—and increasing 
payments to seniors; and in the same year, voters rejected an 
initiative repealing cross-filing of elections. 24 
Another reason why only a few measures used this process was 
that the legislature, in order to remove the measure from the ballot, 
had to adopt it word for word. 25 Proponents and the legislature could 
not negotiate with each other to forge a compromise measure or to 
perfect imperfect proposals. 26 
 
 17. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (repealed 1966). 
 18. CTR. FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, supra note 2, at 113; see CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 1 
(repealed 1966). 
 19. See CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (repealed 1966); see also CTR. FOR GOVERNMENTAL 
STUDIES, supra note 2, at 113 n.48 (giving an example of an initiative appearing on a ballot in 
November and noting that initiatives could only appear on general and not primary election 
ballots). 
 20. CTR. FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, supra note 2, at 112–13. 
 21. See id. 
 22. See id. at 113 n.46. 
 23. JOHN M. ALLSWANG, CALIFORNIA INITIATIVES AND REFERENDUMS 1912–1990: A 
SURVEY AND GUIDE TO RESEARCH 96 (1991). 
 24. Id. at 111 (noting that cross-filing allowed candidates to seek the nomination from more 
than one party). 
 25. CTR. FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, supra note 2, at 113. 
 26. Id.  
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III.  USE OF INDIRECT INITIATIVE IN STATES  
OTHER THAN CALIFORNIA 
Ten of the twenty-four other states that have the initiative 
process provide for some form of indirect initiative. Those states are 
Alaska, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Nevada, Ohio, 
Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. 27  
All of these states except Utah and Washington mandate that the 
initiative proponent use the indirect method for statutes. 28 However, 
both Utah and Washington offer an optional incentive to choose the 
indirect option. 29 Washington gives those proponents who opt for the 
indirect initiative process ten months to circulate a statutory 
initiative. 30 If the proponent chooses to avoid going to the legislature, 
he or she only has six months to circulate the measure. 31 
However, a closer examination of the Washington state law 
shows that this incentive requires the proponents to finish collecting 
signatures by the beginning of the election year in order to give the 
legislature the entire election year to consider the merits of the 
measure. 32 Most proponents will not want to start collecting 
signatures that early. In contrast, proponents who choose the direct 
initiative route can start collecting signatures ten months before the 
election and must submit their signatures a mere four months before 
the election. 33 
Utah provides an alternative to initiative proponents: go the 
direct or indirect route. 34 If the proponent chooses the indirect option, 
he or she must gather signatures equaling at least 5 percent of the last 
gubernatorial vote. 35 Then the measure goes to the legislature, which 
has to approve it without change (except for technical 
 
 27. Id. at 124 n.72; see e.g., MISS. CONST. art. 15, § 273. South Dakota ended its indirect-
initiative system in 1988, twenty-two years after California repealed its process. CTR. FOR 
GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, supra note 2, at 124 n.72 
 28. CTR. FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, supra note 2, at 127. 
 29. See id.; see also The Indirect Initiative, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 
http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=16587 (last visited Nov. 17, 2010) (“In Utah, the initial 
signature requirement is lower for the indirect process.”). 
 30. CTR. FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, supra note 2, at 127. 
 31. See id. 
 32. See WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.72.030 (2009). 
 33. Id. 
 34. The Indirect Initiative, supra note 29. 
 35. UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-7-201(1)(a) (West 2004). 
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amendments). 36 If the legislature rejects the proposal, then the 
proponent has to collect signatures equaling another 5 percent of the 
last gubernatorial vote—for a total of 10 percent—the same 
percentage that a proponent who tries to qualify a direct initiative 
must gather. 37 Thus, the only advantage in Utah for a proponent is 
the chance that the legislature will approve its indirect initiative after 
just 5 percent (rather than 10 percent) of the last gubernatorial vote 
has been collected. 38 Using the indirect option also means that the 
proponent is at a disadvantage if the legislature does not approve the 
measure. 39 The proponent will have to re-energize circulators and 
perhaps even recruit and train new petition gatherers. 
Unlike Washington and Utah, the remaining eight states require 
the indirect method for statutes. For example, in Ohio, after the 
proponents gather signatures equaling at least 3 percent of the last 
gubernatorial vote, the initiative must go to the legislature for 
consideration. 40 If the legislature passes the measure in its original 
form or with amendments, the initiative does not appear on the 
ballot. 41 If the legislature rejects the proposal, the proponents must 
circulate the initiative for an additional 3 percent of signatures before 
it can be placed on the ballot. 42 The proponents may amend their 
initiative if either or both houses of the legislature have passed such 
amendments. 43 This process is only used for statutory initiatives, not 
for petitions that amend the constitution. 44 
In Alaska, a measure may not go on the ballot until after the 
legislature has considered it. 45 If the legislature passes a measure in 
 
 36. Id. § 20A-7-208(1)(a)–(b). 
 37. Id. § 20A-7-208(2). 
 38. The Indirect Initiative, supra note 29 (“[P]resenting an indirect initiative to the 
Legislature requires signatures equal to 5 percent of the votes cast for governor in the last 
election. However, if the indirect initiative is rejected by the Legislature, proponents must gather 
additional signatures equal to 10 percent of the votes . . . .”). 
 39. Id. 
 40. OHIO CONST. art. II, § 1b. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id.; CTR. FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, supra note 2, at 124–25. 
 44. Compare OHIO CONST. art. II, § 1b (describing the process by which initiatives can be 
used to enact Ohio state laws), with OHIO CONST. art. II, § 1a (describing a separate process by 
which initiatives can be used to amend the Ohio Constitution). 
 45. ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 4; CTR. FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, supra note 2, at 125; 
GORDON HARRISON, ALASKA LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS AGENCY, ALASKA’S CONSTITUTION: A 
CITIZEN’S GUIDE 179 (4th ed. 2002) available at http://w3.legis.state.ak.us/docs/pdf/ 
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response to an initiative, the lieutenant governor, with the 
concurrence of the attorney general, determines whether the 
legislative act is substantially the same as the initiative. 46 If they 
determine that the legislative act and the initiative are substantially 
the same, the initiative is removed from the ballot, even if the 
proponents object. 47 If the legislature does not pass a bill in response 
to the initiative, the initiative goes on the next statewide ballot held 
at least 120 days after the legislature has adjourned. 48 
Wyoming’s indirect initiative procedure is very similar to 
Alaska’s, except that only the attorney general decides if the 
legislative measure is close enough to the initiative that the measure 
will not go on the ballot. 49 The procedure in Alaska and Wyoming 
adversely affects initiatives since the proponents have no control 
over the final language approved by the legislature and cannot object 
to a legislative determination that their initiative should not be placed 
on the ballot. 50 
In Massachusetts, the initiative must go to the legislature for 
consideration. 51 If the legislature adopts the measure as written, the 
initiative does not go on the ballot. 52 The law allows the proponents 
to submit perfecting amendments to the attorney general while the 
legislature considers the initiative. 53 If the legislature does not 
approve the initiative, then the proponent must obtain additional 
 
citizens_guide.pdf (“By the terms of this section, an initiative may not go before the voters until 
the legislature has had an opportunity to contemplate the subject matter of the initiative over a full 
session and decide whether to adopt a similar law.”). 
 46. ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 4; ALASKA STAT. § 15.45.210 (2008); CTR. FOR 
GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, supra note 2, at 125 n.73. 
 47. ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 4; ALASKA STAT. § 15.45.210; CTR. FOR GOVERNMENTAL 
STUDIES, supra note 2, at 125. 
 48. ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 4. 
 49. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 22-24-119(a)(iii) (2009); CTR. FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, 
supra note 2, at 125 n.73. 
 50. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 22-24-122; CTR. FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, supra note 2, at 
125 (“Even in Alaska and Wyoming, . . . proponents are given neither the authority nor an 
incentive to negotiate improvements in the proposal with the legislature.”). 
 51. MASS. CONST. amend. art. XLVIII, pt. II. 
 52. MASS. CONST. amend. art. XLVIII, pt. V, § 1, amended by MASS. CONST. amend. art. 
LXXXI, § 2. 
 53. MASS. CONST. amend. art. XLVIII, pt. V, § 2, amended by MASS. CONST. amend. art. 
LXXXI, § 3. 
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signatures amounting to 0.5 percent of all votes cast in the last 
gubernatorial election. 54 
An initiative amending the Massachusetts Constitution must also 
go to the legislature for consideration. 55 The proposal must receive at 
least a 25 percent vote at two successive legislative sessions to be 
placed on the ballot. 56 
Four other states—Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, and Nevada—
also mandate that any initiative that has qualified for the ballot go to 
the legislature first. 57 If the legislature enacts the measure without a 
single change, the initiative does not go on the ballot. 58 If the 
legislature rejects the proposal, it goes on the ballot. 59 These states 
also permit the legislature to put competing measures on the same 
ballot as the initiative. 60 
IV.  IDEAL SYSTEM FOR CALIFORNIA 
Voters do not like having to vote on numerous ballot measures 61 
or on measures that are poorly drafted. 62 The process that is 
suggested below alleviates both of these concerns. 
When a proponent turns in enough signatures for the secretary of 
state to require the counties to begin verifying them to determine 
whether the initiative has qualified for the ballot, the secretary of 
state must notify the legislature that it has thirty days to consider the 
 
 54. MASS. CONST. amend. art. XLVIII, pt. V, § 1, amended by MASS. CONST. amend. art. 
LXXXI, § 2. 
 55. MASS. CONST. amend. art. XLVIII, pt. IV, § 4. 
 56. MASS. CONST. amend. art. XLVIII, pt. IV, §§ 4–5; CTR. FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, 
supra note 2, at 126 n.74. 
 57. See, e.g., MISS. CONST. art. 15, § 273; see also CTR. FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, 
supra note 2, at 124 n.72 (listing states that employ a form of the indirect-initiative process). 
 58. CTR. FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, supra note 2, at 124. 
 59. CTR. FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, supra note 2, at 124; see, e.g., MISS. CONST. art. 
15, § 273(6). 
 60. ME. CONST. art. IV, pt. III, § 18, cl. 2; MICH. CONST. art. II, § 9; MISS. CONST. art. 15, 
§ 273(7); NEV. CONST. art. XIX, § 2, cl. 3; see also CTR. FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, supra 
note 2, at 124 (“In some states, such as Maine, Michigan, Nevada and Washington, if the 
legislature adopts a law that differs from the initiative in any respect, then both the initiative and 
the law are placed on the ballot.”). 
 61. See CTR. FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, supra note 2, at 348 (citing poll results 
showing 57 percent of voters “feel that there are too many initiatives on the ballot”). 
 62. See id. at 98 (“Voters may feel justifiably betrayed by initiatives that, because of 
ambiguous or unconstitutional provisions, are unable to deliver on ballot box promises.”). 
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measure. The legislature has the option to hold hearings on the 
proposal but is not required to do so. 
During this thirty-day period, the legislature and the proponent 
can work together to reach an agreement to take the initiative off the 
ballot. If the proponent, the legislature, and the governor agree on a 
solution and enact a bill, the initiative is no longer needed, and the 
voters will not consider it. If the legislature and the proponent cannot 
agree, the measure goes on the ballot if its proponent has gathered 
enough qualifying signatures. 
There are several reasons why the legislature and the proponents 
should agree to legislation that takes initiatives off the ballot. First, 
the public is better served if the legislature enacts a bill that is 
acceptable to the proponents. The legislative process at its best is far 
better than the initiative process at its best because the legislature can 
take the time to examine legislation, and the public can view all the 
committee and staff analyses regarding the legislation. 63 In addition, 
the legislative hearings are open to the public and allow discussion 
on ways to improve the proposal. 64 If there is a resolution, then the 
legislature will and should receive credit for solving a problem that 
was the subject of an initiative. 
Having the legislature pass the initiative should also help the 
proponents since they will not have to risk their initiative failing at 
the ballot box. Moreover, the proponents will not have to raise 
campaign funds to try to pass their propositions; in many cases, this 
could save the proponents $5 to $10 million. 65 But most importantly, 
if the legislature passes their initiative, it ensures that it becomes law. 
In 2006, CGS commissioned a poll on the initiative process. 66 
The poll was conducted by Fairbank, Maslin, Maullin & Associates, 
under the direction of Winner & Associates. 67 On the question of 
whether the proponents and the legislature should be permitted a 
thirty-day period in which to work out legislation that would take the 
 
 63. See id. at 96. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See id. at 181 tbl.4.5. 
 66. Id. at 348; FAIRBANK, MASLIN, MAULLIN & ASSOCS., CTR. FOR GOVERNMENTAL 
STUDIES, SOLUTIONS FOR DEMOCRACY, RANDOM DIGIT DIAL SURVEY AND ARS STUDY (2006) 
(on file with author). 
 67. CTR. FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, supra note 2, at 348 n.3; FAIRBANK, MASLIN, 
MAULLIN & ASSOCS., supra note 66. 
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initiative off the ballot, 56 percent of Californians agreed provided 
the proponent was in control of the measure’s contents. 68 
Based on forty years of experience watching the legislature 
respond to initiatives, it is my best estimate that the legislature and 
the proponents would agree on a solution between 15 and 20 percent 
of the time, thus reducing the number of measures on the California 
ballot by one or two per election. 
Informally, initiative proponents and legislators have 
occasionally worked together to enact initiatives through legislation 
rather than through the voters. CGS’s Democracy by Initiative lists a 
few such cases. For example, in 1998, the legislature and initiative 
proponents agreed to enact legislation that permitted school districts 
to increase the number of charter schools and to make it easier to 
create such schools. 69 Reed Hastings, the initiative’s proponent, 
threatened the legislature by showing them the number of signatures 
he had gathered (over 1.1 million). 70 He pledged not to submit the 
signatures if the legislature passed a bill. 71 The California Teachers 
Association endorsed the bill but added a provision requiring 
teachers in such schools to have a state credential and a section that 
mandated oversight of the school’s curriculum and spending. 72 
A.  Arguments Against the Indirect Initiative 
When CGS suggested an indirect initiative approach in its first 
book, published in 1992, 73 no legislator introduced it as a bill and 
nobody submitted it as an initiative. Since 1992, the Center has 
talked to a number of strong supporters of the initiative process, 
some of whom are adamant that the process should not be changed in 
any way, whether by the legislature or through an initiative. 74 Their 
arguments center on their distrust of the legislative process. 75 They 
look at what other states have done to initiatives after they have 
 
 68. CTR. FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, supra note 2, at 133; FAIRBANK, MASLIN, 
MAULLIN & ASSOCS., supra note 66, at 25. 
 69. CTR. FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, supra note 2, at 111–12. 
 70. Id. at 87, 111. 
 71. Id. at 87. 
 72. Id. at 111–12. 
 73. CTR. FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, supra note 1, at 4–5 (providing an outline of 
recommendations for initiative process reform). 
 74. See CTR. FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, supra note 2, at 134–35. 
 75. Id. 
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passed, and what the California legislature has tried to do with 
enacted initiatives that permit legislative amendments. 76 Their 
experiences with the legislative process have been negative, and thus 
they want to leave the current law as it stands. 77 
Some who oppose any change also worry that initiative 
proponents might be too easily persuaded to drop their initiatives, 
either because of intense pressure from the legislature and the 
political elite or even because they might be bought off. 78 They are 
concerned that proponents might become convinced that an initiative 
has no chance of passing, and they will therefore accept severely 
weakened amendments in order to get something enacted and be able 
to claim credit for the passage of legislation. 79 In such a case, the 
proponents might not represent the will of those who signed the 
petition, who had supported something much stronger than what the 
legislature and the proponents accepted. Some people consider 
signing a petition to be a contract with the proponents so that the 
proponents should always be required to submit it to the people for a 
vote. 80 However, even under the process now in effect, the 
proponents can change the so-called contract, 81 at least until they 
submit it to the counties. 82 The proponents can stop collecting 
signatures or fail to turn in signatures already collected if they work 
out a deal with the legislature during the circulation period. 83 
In addition, very few people who sign petitions read the text or 
even the summary on top of the petitions. 84 They generally sign 
because they agree with the concept or, in some cases, because they 
do not want to be impolite to the circulator. 85 
 
 76. See id. at 129–30. 
 77. See id. at 83 (“For [its staunch defenders], the initiative process stands as the people’s 
last resort, a way to work around an unresponsive and gridlocked state government.”). 
 78. See id. at 83, 270–71 (discussing the possibility of corruption and manipulation in the 
initiative process). 
 79. See id. at 74–75 (“Some initiative proponents . . . deliberately add popular (and 
constitutionally questionable) provisions and terminology to increase the likelihood of passage.”). 
 80. Id. at 135. 
 81. See CAL. ELEC. CODE § 9002 (West 2010). 
 82. See id. § 9030(a). 
 83. See CTR. FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, supra note 2, at 133 (“California’s experience 
indicates that some proponents are already willing to work with the legislature instead of placing 
their measures on the ballot . . . .”). 
 84. Id. at 135. 
 85. See id. 
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B.  Better-Drafted Initiatives 
It is unlikely that the legislature will enact a large number of 
initiatives with the proponents’ approval. 86 The proponents usually 
circulate initiatives because the legislature has failed to address the 
problem. 87 In the overwhelming number of instances where the 
legislature and the proponents cannot work out a compromise that 
takes the initiative off the ballot, the proponents should be allowed to 
amend the initiative and put the amended initiative on the ballot. This 
amendment, however, should be permitted only if the attorney 
general approves the initiative as being consistent with the proposal’s 
original purposes (subject to the Sacramento County Superior 
Court’s review if challenged). 
This proposal should generate better-drafted initiatives. Almost 
no initiative or bill introduced by legislators is perfectly drafted. 
During the circulation period, and while the legislature is considering 
the measure, the proponents will most likely discover drafting 
errors. 88 Under current law, the proponents cannot change one word 
of the initiative once the attorney general has issued a title unless the 
proponents want to start the process over again. 89 
Perhaps the best example of an initiative that needed 
clarification occurred in 1996 when the California Public Interest 
Research Group circulated a very tough ethics and campaign reform 
initiative, Proposition 212. 90 Only after the proponents had turned in 
the signatures did they learn that the initiative included a provision 
that repealed a ban on gifts to legislators and other public officials. 91 
The proponents refused to admit their mistake, insisting that they had 
meant to repeal the provision and that the legislature would fix the 
problem by imposing even stricter gift restrictions if the initiative 
passed. 92 Proposition 212 failed, with the controversy over the gift 
repeal perhaps playing a factor in the measure’s defeat. 93 
 
 86. See id. at 83 (“Even when the legislature appears to respond to the threat of an initiative, 
proponents do not always find the compromise acceptable.”). 
 87. See id. at 1 (“On many of these pressing issues, the elected state legislature and governor 
failed to act or respond in a manner that would satisfy interested parties.”). 
 88. See id. at 2. 
 89. Id. at 96. 
 90. See id. at 102. 
 91. See id. 
 92. See id. 
 93. See id. 
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Another good example of why the indirect initiative should be 
mandatory occurred in 2008. Starting in 2005, a coalition of 
transportation groups circulated a measure to change the way the 
legislature could take gas tax transportation money. 94 During this 
period, the proponents also negotiated a compromise measure with 
the legislature that was put on the 2006 ballot as Proposition 1A, 
which the voters approved. 95 
Unfortunately, although the proponents attempted to prevent 
their first measure from qualifying by holding back 300,000 
signatures, the proponents had already gathered and submitted 7,000 
too many signatures than necessary, 96 forcing the secretary of state to 
certify the measure and put it on the February 2008 ballot as 
Proposition 91. 97 The voters were confronted with an unusual ballot 
pamphlet. In the section discussing the official arguments in support 
of the initiative, the proponents of Proposition 91 urged people to 
vote “No” on the measure. Moreover, the pamphlet did not include 
any arguments against the measure. 98 Although Proposition 91 failed, 
it still received almost 42 percent of the vote, 99 presumably from 
voters who did not realize that the legislature and the measure’s 
proponents had reached a compromise two years earlier. Had the 
indirect initiative proposal been in effect, the state would not have 
wasted state funds printing an extra few pages in the ballot pamphlet, 
and voters would not have needed to spend time studying a measure 
that even proponents no longer thought necessary. 
A similar situation occurred in 2004, when the proponents of an 
initiative that had already qualified for the ballot negotiated a 
compromise measure with the legislature to put another measure on 
 
 94. Id. at 112. The proponents wanted to prevent the legislature from using the gas tax 
money for non-transportation purposes. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. See id. (explaining that the surplus signatures were enough to qualify the initiative for the 
ballot, leaving proponents unable to withdraw it). 
 98. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, CALIFORNIA PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARY ELECTION, TUESDAY 
FEBRUARY 5, 2008: OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE 10–11 (2008); see also Michael 
Cabanatuan, Prop 91: Voters Defeating Gas Tax Measure, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 6, 2008, 
http://articles.sfgate.com/2008-02-06/news/17141833_1_gas-tax-transportation-california-
initiative (“But in their official argument in favor of the initiative, they wrote: ‘Vote no on 
Proposition 91. It’s no longer needed.’”). 
 99. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, FEBRUARY 5, 2008, PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARY ELECTION: 
SUPPLEMENT TO THE STATEMENT OF VOTE 5 (2008). 
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the ballot covering the same subject. 100 The legislature put the 
compromise measure, Proposition 1A, and the original initiative, 
Proposition 65, before the voters on the same ballot. 101 This time, 
however, the legislature put both propositions together in a 
supplemental ballot pamphlet. 102 The proponents of Proposition 65 
did not write an argument in favor of the measure. 103 Thus, only a 
“No” argument appeared in the section for official arguments in 
support of Proposition 65, urging voters to approve Proposition 1A 
and to defeat Proposition 65. 104 Eighty-four percent of voters 
supported Proposition 1A, while 62 percent voted against 
Proposition 65. 105 
Finally, the person who signs the petition is in the same position 
as a legislator who votes for a bill that is subsequently amended. In 
the legislature there will be a final vote on the bill, and the legislator 
can vote against the bill if the amendments are not acceptable. 
Similarly, a person who has signed a petition that is later amended 
can also vote against the measure on the ballot. 106 
V.  CONCLUSION 
California should return to the indirect initiative process because 
it is the best way to reduce the number of measures on the ballot and 
to ensure that proposals put forth by initiatives are well drafted and 
do what the proponents intend. 
However, it may be very difficult to convince the legislature to 
enact a variation of the system that was in effect until the end of 
1966. Also, initiative proponents may be worried about appearing 
 
 100. See CTR. FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, supra note 2, at 112 (“[I]n 2004 Proposition 65 
proponents used the measure as a bargaining tool with the legislature in their negotiations to 
better protect local government revenue from state-level appropriations.”). 
 101. Id. 
 102. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, CALIFORNIA GENERAL ELECTION: SUPPLEMENTAL OFFICIAL 
VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE 3 (2004). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id.; see also CTR. FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, supra note 2, at 112 (“The initiative 
proponents and the legislature both agreed to campaign for Proposition 1A and against 
Proposition 65.”). 
 105. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, PRESIDENTIAL GENERAL ELECTION NOVEMBER 2, 2004: 
STATEMENT OF VOTE xxi (2004). 
 106. See CTR. FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, supra note 2, at 4–5 (explaining that initiative 
proponents must first obtain a sufficient number of signatures to qualify an initiative for the ballot 
and that once the initiative is on the ballot, the initiative needs a majority vote to be enacted). 
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before the legislature to defend their measures. They may be 
concerned that the legislature will force them to take their measures 
off of the ballot by passing enticing substitute measures. In addition, 
initiative proponents may want to have a campaign even if it means 
that their measure may be defeated. Moreover, the legislature may 
not want to be forced to take the time to consider all of the initiatives 
that have qualified for the ballot. 
For these reasons, it seems more likely that an initiative to 
amend the initiative process will be necessary to achieve the 
suggested reforms. The year to put forth such a proposal is 2012. 
